Talk:Random number generator (device)

From Rosetta Code

Primer notes

On Linux, reading from /dev/urandom pulls from the system entropy pool (which may contributed to by HRNGs, among other sources), but provides psuedorandom numbers if that entropy pool dries up. reading from /dev/random, on the other hand, pulls from the same entropy pool, but blocks whenever the entropy pool dries up. --Michael Mol 14:03, 11 January 2011 (UTC)

I guess that a solution may use either /dev/random or /dev/urandom. The entropy pool probably has enough entropy for a 32-bit integer. I prefer to use /dev/urandom. Many kernels use a secure hash, like SHA1, to convert the entropy pool to random numbers. (NetBSD uses SHA1.) Even if the entropy pool is dry, the random numbers should remain secure. I guess that you would have to reverse or defeat SHA1 to replicate the pseudorandom numbers from a dry pool; but SHA1 is a secure hash so difficult to reverse.
OpenBSD 4.8 and before had /dev/urandom giving random numbers, but /dev/random giving only errors. (This was because /dev/random was a reserved device, and /dev/srandom of OpenBSD was like /dev/random of Linux.) So /dev/urandom was better than /dev/random for OpenBSD. This has changed with OpenBSD 4.9 (from May 2011); now /dev/random also gives random numbers. So if some example on Rosetta Code uses /dev/random, I will not care to change it to /dev/urandom. --Kernigh 04:47, 8 May 2011 (UTC)

feels like this is all outdated now. please, read my comment below! 😘 --cregox (talk) 11:13, 5 January 2021 (UTC)

Libraries and features

Is it within the scope of this task to use libraries and language features which provide random numbers derived from both hardware and software sources, or is the intent here to show a more low-level access to the underlying operating system itself? --Michael Mol 14:03, 11 January 2011 (UTC)

I would say yes, if there is some hardware involved, so that the random numbers are not 100% "pseudo". The stress should be on random numbers. Just showing how to read from an arbitrary device is perhaps not very interesting. --Abu 14:25, 11 January 2011 (UTC)
To be certain, the task's fundamental drive is to obtain numbers which are not deterministically-generated, even with an unknown seed? --Michael Mol 14:44, 11 January 2011 (UTC)
Er. I was unclear. Clarification handy, though: --Michael Mol 15:21, 11 January 2011 (UTC)
OK: So let's say, it should involve real-world generated entropy during each step, and define the scope of this task to what is covered by the Wikipedia article. --Abu 15:26, 11 January 2011 (UTC)


in #pearl someone said:

Whether /dev/urandom is good enough for cryptographic work is debated, though on most UNIX systems it is at least as good as the Win32 Crypto API.

that's also what came up on the summary i found on duck when searching for `kotlin dev/urandom`.

but is it really debated? or is this outdated? or was it ever true?

from what i've been researching on my free time since yesterday, both `/dev/random` and u are not only good enough, they're actively used for cryptographic work. and given windows is now linux, i highly doubt it would use any other resource for true randomness (plus windows have always been notoriously less secure than any *nix to begin with).

feels like a "global warming" debate, if john oliver knows what i mean.

--cregox (talk) 11:10, 5 January 2021 (UTC)