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Talk:Break OO privacy: Difference between revisions
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::::::: of course anything that happens outside of the process is beyond the control of the language, but the question is if it is possible to prevent access to private datastructures within the process.
:::::::: If the OS allows random processes to access a program's memory then it almost certainly allows that program to access its own memory. --[[User:Rdm|Rdm]] 14:02, 25 October 2011 (UTC)
::::::::: ok, good point. we need to limit the scope then. can we assume that at least unix based OSes do not allow a program to access another programs memory?
::::::::: and is it fair to say that circumventing OS restrictions is beyond the scope of the issue we try to highlight?
::::::::: would that be enough to confine attempts to get around protection to cases within the process?--[[User:EMBee|eMBee]] 14:20, 25 October 2011 (UTC)
::::::: consider a system that allows you to load new code at runtime (as lisp, pike, python, javascript and many other languages do) is it possible to build the language/compiler/virtual machine in such a way as to make it impossible for newly injected code to access protected datastructures? the question is related to whether it is possible to build sandboxes (like for javascript) that are actually save. certainly sandbox developers claim it is possible, and if it is possible for them then it should be possible for a regular language runtime as well.
::::::: to find out which languages offer this possibility, in particular among languages that allow to inject code at runtime, is a very interesting question.--[[User:EMBee|eMBee]] 12:44, 25 October 2011 (UTC)
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